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olmes Rolston Ill's
Environmental Ethics 1 is a
wide-ranging work
containing many valuable
insights and suggestions. But
his account of the human treatment of animals2 is
seriously confused. It contains arbitrary distinc
tions which serve as an apologetic for the status
quo in our society. In this paper I explain the
problem as Rolston sees it and the solution that
Rolston offers. After criticizing Rolston's solu
tion, I propose a significantly different one that
rests entirely upon views that Rolston endorses.
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The Problem

share an interest, as people and elk share an
interest in eating, satisfaction of the human's
interest should take priority because a well-fed
human can realize other values (create poetry
or discover mathematical truths) which well
fed elk cannot approach (p. 74).
Rolston does not conclude, as did Kant,
that only human beings are worthy of
moral consideration. "From superiority we do
not move merely to privilege but also to
responsibility" (p. 77). Human beings "reflect
the highest awareness of values only when
they see that humans are not the sole locus of
value" (p. 78). Thus, for Rolston, human
superiority is reconciled with a basic concern
for the well-being of nonhumans by the
consideration that part of human superiority
is precisely this ability to be concerned
about nonhumans.
Concern for animals is naturalistically
based, according to Rolston; it rests on
natural commonalities between human and
nonhuman animals. Many animals can suffer
from deprivations of food, water, exercise
and social intercourse, just as human beings
do. Animals thus have interests similar to
the human interest in avoiding such depri
vations and suffering. Human superiority is
manifested in part by our acceptance of uni
versal benevolence and the Golden Rule as
guides for our own behavior. These suggest
that, all things being equal, we avoid inflict
ing harm on animals, and that we relieve
their suffering when possible (p. 58).
Rolston approves, for example, of a decision
requiring a Wyoming rancher to lay down
part of his fence so that antelope could
migrate in a hard winter to needed foraging
lands (pp. 54-55).
Rolston believes, however, that counter
vailing principles drawn from ecology are
often overriding. It is natural for there to be

Rolston recognizes that an environmental
ethic must accept human beings as a part of,
not apart from, nature. This means that envi
ronmental ethics must prescribe behavior
that is natural in the sense that it accords
with the place of human beings in the bio
sphere. But what behaviors are natural to
human beings in relation to animals? It is not
always clear. For example, people are
naturally omnivores. So does living in accor
dance with nature suggest that we hunt and
raise animals for food? People in most cli
mates have a natural (at least occasional)
need for warm clothing. Early human beings
used animal skins for this and other purposes.
So is it natural for people to hunt, trap and
raise animals for pelts and leather? People
naturally invent tools to help them survive
and thrive, so does living in accordance with
nature countenance using animals in medical
experiments that result in tools (medicines)
designed to prolong and/or enhance human
life? Grooming is natural to human beings.
Does this justify as natural the use of animals
in experiments needed to safely (and legally)
market new cosmetics? People are naturally
curious about animals. Is it, therefore, natural
for people to confine exotic animals in zoos
to satisfy human curiosity?

Rolston's Account
Rolston claims that human beings are supe
rior to other animals in having a greater range
of interests and possibilities. Only we can
read, write and contemplate religious ques
tions. Because there is value in the exercise of
these capacities, human life is typically more
valuable than the life of any other kind of
animal. Even where humans and nonhumans
Between the Species
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predators and prey in an ecosystem. It is also
natural for species to evolve through
intraspecific competition that leaves many
losers as well as winners (p. 56). Much
animal suffering, then, makes environmental
sense. "This urges a nonmeddlesome Golden
Rule and checks benevolence by the realities
of ecosystemic nature" (p. 58). Thus,
"humans have no duties, in interspecific
environmental ethics, to interrupt the course
of wild nature" (p. 59). We should express
our concern about the suffering of wild
animals by not amplifying the cruelty in
nature beyond baseline suffering endemic to
ecosystemic routines. "So far, this is an ethic
of nonaddition but not of subtraction" (p. 60,
Rolston's emphasis). "When exploiting
nature for human interests," we have no
"obligation to reduce ... [animal] suffering
below levels found independently of the
human presence" (p. 59).
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The foregoing reflects two of the three
ways in which Rolston would limit the
human exploitation of animals. First,
because animals have the same interest as we
in avoiding suffering, humans should not
inflict pointless suffering. Second, humans
should not cause animals to suffer "more, on
average, than might have been their lot in
wild nature" (p. 85).
The third limitation rests on a distinction
that Rolston makes among human activities
between those based on nature and those
based on culture. Because of their superior
abilities, human beings live in culture as well
as in nature. For example, "marriage, truth
telling, promise-keeping, justice, charity 
these are not events at all in spontaneous
nature" (p. 81). They reflect superior human
capacities which are expressed only in culture
and which form part of interhuman ethics.
The differences between interhuman
ethics and environmental ethics are illustrat
ed by Rolston in reference to interventions
designed to prevent suffering. Because
animals do not, and cannot, live in culture,
we should apply only environmental ethics in
our relationships with them. As we have
seen, Rolston maintains that environmental
ethics should conform to the "realities of
ecosystemic nature" (p. 58). Thus, a fawn
should not be saved from predation by a
grizzly bear. But a human child has a right to
be saved. "The human victim has a right only
in relation to other humans, with whom it
coexists in culture. The grizzly is not violat
ing human rights when it eats a child, but
other humans are if they fail to rescue the
victim" (p. 57).
Rolston employs the distinction between
human activities that are in nature and those
that are in culture to frame his third limita
tion on the human exploitation of animals.
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That exploitation must correspond to natural,
rather than to cultural human pursuits. For
example, human beings are naturally omnivores. "Hunter-gatherer cultures are the earliest known, and when agricultural cultures
replace them, humans have no duty to cease
to be omnivores and become herbivores" (p.
80). So eating meat is natural, not merely cultural. People are morally permitted to eat
meat, then, so long as they inflict no pointless
suffering and cause animals to suffer "no more,
on average, than might have been their lot in
wild nature" (p. 85).
The killing and eating of animals, when
they occur in culture, are still events, in
nature; '" no matter how superimposed
by culture '" Analogous to predation,
human consumption of animals is to be
judged by the principles of environmental ethics, not those of interhuman
ethics. (p. 79)
Rolston extends this logic to other uses of
animals. He writes:
There seems no reason to prohibit those
uses of animals to provide utilities which,
like food, secure health and basic human
well-being: leather for shoes, wool for
jackets, insulin for diabetics. This
stretches the homologous logic beyond
that of food chains, but it recognizes that
in culture there are necessities unknown
in nature. (p. 85)
However, such necessities justify the use of
animals only when they are clearly related to
natural imperatives, as insulin is related to the
maintenance of life itself. Desires which are
more purely cultural do not, according to
Rolston, justify the use of animals. He objects
strongly to trapping and killing wild animals
to make fashionable fur coats. However,
Domestic fur bearers, which would not
otherwise exist and are humanely
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treated, are an intermediary case, but
even here the fur products are luxuries
and cannot be made to fit the ecological
model. Using fur and hide for status
symbol is something different from using
them as survival tools. (p. 85)
On the other hand, Rolston maintains that
"a carefully regulated harvest" of alligators
in Louisiana is justified, even though the
goal is to craft the hides into "ultra chic, terribly expensive purses and shoes," if "the
alligator population needs to be cropped for
its own good or to prevent its becoming a
nuisance" (p. 84). In addition, he suggests
acceptability of such uses of alligators
around the world on the grounds that "the
survival of the alligator may depend on its
being economically valuable" (p. 84).
Though Rolston considers acceptable the
humane rearing and slaughter of animals for
food, he objects to ritual methods of slaughter required by Islamic and Jewish religious
traditions because "religious methods of
slaughter result in a degree of suffering and
distress that does not occur in a properly
stunned animal" (p. 83). The additional
"pain is ecologically pointless; it has point
only culturally and, by the account given
here, is not justified" (p. 84).

Critique of Rolston's Account
I find Rolston's account of our duties
regarding animals unconvincing. It rests on a
problematic distinction among human activities between those which are natural and
those which are cultural. Because it is problematic, the distinction leads to arbitrary and
culturally self-serving differentiations among
various ways that human beings interact
with animals.
The distinction between natural and cul-
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coats. Modern people who can obtain substitutes for the fur in coats can equally obtain
substitutes for the leather in shoes. Why,
then, is one use impermissible culturally and
the other permissible naturally?
A similar arbitrariness characterizes
Rolston's distinction between humanely
raising animals for food, which is acceptable
naturally, and humanely raising animals for
fur, which Rolston considers "an intermediary
case" (p. 85), that is, not obviously acceptable. But how do the cases differ? Clothing
and food are equally natural needs, and
animals are no more harmed in humane husbandry for fur than for meat.
Rolston declares unacceptable culturally
the use of fur and hides for luxuries and
status symbols (p. 85). Yet he condones
hunting alligators for hides that will be
made into "ultra chic, terribly expensive
purses and shoes" (p. 84), if "the alligator
population needs to be cropped for its own
good" (p. 84). But carnivorous species, such
as alligators, unlike herbivores such as deer,
do not cause environmental damage through
overpopulation, because food supplies
naturally limit population increases) Again,
Rolston appears to be making a distinction
that corresponds to no real difference. Some
luxury products are condemned while for no
environmentally sound reason others are
condoned.
Another reason Rolston gives for condoning the alligator hunt is that "seventeen of
twenty-one crocodilian species worldwide are
endangered ... and some think they can be
saved only if it can be made economically
advantageous to native peoples to keep them"
(pp. 84-85). This may, indeed, be a good strategy to save endangered species, but it is hard
to reconcile with Rolston's view that only
natural, rather than cultural, human needs

tural human activities is problematic because
all human activities are cultural. Hominids
evolved culture and then evolved culturally as
they evolved biologically. So there never was
a natural, noncultural human being or human
pursuit. It is natural, and inevitable, for all
human activities to be culturally influenced.
This renders impossible the task which
Rolston sets himself of differentiating among
human activities those which are cultural
from those which are natural. Yet it is largely
such differentiation that Rolston employs to
determine our duties regarding animals. All
other things being equal, animals can be used
in natural pursuits, but not in cultural ones.

M

ost people in the
United States condone
hunting for meat while
abhorring bullfights,
conveniently ignoring the fact
that in modern cultures both
are recreations, neither is
necessary, and the animals
involved are harmed equally.

Because the basic distinction between
natural and cultural activities is problematic,
Rolston's conclusions about what is acceptable and unacceptable appear arbitrary. As we
have seen, animals can be used for leather for
shoes but not for fur coats (p. 85). But what is
the difference? The human need for shoes is
no more natural than the human need for
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relating to the mysteries are equally culturally particularistic. Neither "sacrament" is
more necessary than the other to human
existence. Modern people have no more
"natural" need for hunting than for Kosher
meat. Again, Rolston makes a distinction
that seems arbitrary.
Rolston's views about medical experimentation on animals are unclear, as he does not
discuss the topic directly. But his statements
on related matters seem to have opposite
implications concerning medical experiments that cause considerable distress to
animals. On the one hand, he considers it
natural and permissible for diabetics to use
animals to get needed insulin. This suggests
the permissibility of using animals for other
medical needs, including the testing of new
drugs and surgical techniques. On the other
hand, he says that we should not cause
animals to suffer any more than they would
in the wild without the presenc~ of human
beings. Many sensitive laboratory animals
are bred to be used in extremely distressing
experiments; such as LO-50 experiments.4 In
these, a test substance is fed (sometimes
force-fed) or injected into animals until half
of the experimental animals die. Because this
seems harder on the animals than life in the
wild, it seems that Rolston would have to
condemn much medical experimentation on
animals. But such tests are needed for the
development of pharmaceutical interventions analogous to the use of insulin.
Rolston's views on this are not at all clear.
His views on factory farming should be
clear, as such farming typically causes animals
more distress than they would experience in
the wild away from people. Many farm
animals are deprived of free movement
throughout their lives. s Yet Rolston fails to
condemn such farming. Nor does he condemn

justify harming animals. To the extent that
any content can be given to the natural/cultural distinction, one would think that the
kinds of economic considerations alluded to
would be on the cultural side. Thus, they
would not render permissible the otherwise
impermissible hunting of alligators for hides
for high fashion apparel and accessories. In
fact, two pages later Rolston himself writes,
"We want our ethical attitudes toward animal
suffering to be consistent with ecology, not
distorted by economics" (p. 86).
Also puzzling are Rolston's views about
the relationship between religion and our
. treatment of animals. As we have seen,
Kosher slaughter is condemned as impermissibly causing extra, unnecessary pain to
animals. The extra pain is unnecessary
because it is inflicted for purely religious, Le.
cultural, reasons. But then Rolston refers
approvingly to the view, associated with
Ortega y Gasset, that "hunting is not sport; it
is a sacrament of the fundamental, mandatory
seeking and taking possession of value that
characterizes an ecosystem and from which
no culture ever escapes" (p. 91, Rolston's
emphasis). Sacraments are associated with
religion no less than are Kosher laws. So why
is Kosher slaughter impermissible whereas
hunting is permissible? Hunting is referred to
as a sacrament connected with ecosystemic
laws from which no culture ever escapes. But
the ecosystemic laws are inescapable, not
hunting as a sacrament of those laws.
Rolston himself points out on the same page
that cameras can replace guns (just as
modern methods of slaughter can replace
Kosher methods). So why is not hunting as
clearly condemned as Kosher slaughter? Both
are particular, cultural ways of relating to the
mysteries of life and death. The mysteries
are universal, but these two methods of
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the premises are applied by Rolston to questions concerning the treatment of individual
animals. I concur with these premises and
have argued for them elsewhere. 6 The point
here, however, is that they are Rolston's views
and that they lead to a coherent environmental ethic concerning the treatment of
animals.
I begin with Rolston's views that human
beings are unique in having moral responsibilities and that our responsibility to avoid
causing unnecessary harm includes the
responsibility to avoid causing animals to
suffer or die unnecessarily. I add to these an
idea of Rolston's, but one which he fails to
associate with the humane treatment of individual animals; it is the idea that the earth's
fecundity is valuable. Aldo Leopold wrote,
"the trend of evolution is to elaborate and
diversify the biota."7 Rolston, correctly, I
think, sees value in this and derives a human
duty from it.

the consumption of meat from such farms.
Instead, by mentioning only the permissibility
of eating meat which is humanely raised and
slaughtered, he gives the false impression that
his principles condone eating the meat that
one typically finds at the grocery store in the
United States.
The combined effect of Rolston's pronouncements, uncertainties, and silences is to
echo popular views, replete with inconsistencies and self-serving blindness. Increasingly
popular is the view that animals should not be
trapped for fur. There is increasing unease
about fur products in general, even those
obtained from animals reared on farms. But
most people have not seen that the same logic
applies to the leather in their shoes and the
meat on their table. Most people in the
United States condone hunting for meat
while abhorring bullfights, conveniently
ignoring the fact that in modem cultures both
are recreations, neither is necessary, and the
animals involved are harmed equally. Most
people are conveniently ignorant of the suffering of animals on factory farms and in
medical experiments. Rolston does nothing to
disturb such people. Instead, he ignores what
most people ignore and tries to find principles
to bring consistency to inconsistent, popular
views. In short, Rolston's account is conservative in the worst sense. It papers over difficulties in the status quo that a philosopher
should be exposing. Through the use of arbitrary distinctions, it assuages consciences that
should be disturbed.

Animals and Evolution
The following is my suggested alternative
account of the natural treatment of animals.
Its premises are drawn entirely from materials found in Rolston's book, though not all
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These ideas bear significantly on the moral
appraisal of practices in some technologically
simple cultures. The (traditional) Inuit in
Alaska and the !Kyng bushmen in Africa do
not interrupt the process of evolutionary speciation; their cultures are compatible with the
natural diversification of the biotas on earth.
So people in such cultures are not violating
duties regarding the biosphere in general
when they adhere to their ecologically benign
cultural practices. From the perspective of
environmental ethics, such people have no
duty to reduce the suffering caused to animals
by practices which are essential to the maintenance of their culture. Traditional Inuit
have no duty to cease hunting seals, and
bushmen have no duty to cease hunting porcupines, even though the hunt causes animals
to suffer and/or die, because this suffering and
death is the minimum necessary to preserve a
way of life that preserves the environment.
The reasoning here parallels that concerning the alleviation of the suffering and death
of animals in the wild. If wilderness is to be
preserved, as I believe it should be (in part
because it is the major locus of natural evolutionary change), then people simply cannot
intervene so as significantly to ameliorate the
suffering and death of wild animals. Such
intervention would destroy wilderness areas as
wilderness areas. Traditional Inuit and !Kyng
cultures are fully part of, not apart from,
wilderness environments. Preserving those
cultures is as much a part of preserving the
wilderness environment as is preserving the
presence of a predator species. Thus, viewing
people as part of, not apart from their environments, and accepting the continued speciation that takes place in wilderness areas as a
good outweighing associated animal suffering
and death, yields the view that people should
let wilderness areas be. Where people are

Nature seems to produce as many
species as it can, certainly not just
enough to stabilize an ecosystem, much
less only species that can directly or
indirectly serve human needs. Humans
ought not to inhibit this exuberant lust
for kinds. (p. 157)
Elsewhere he writes, "It is not form (species)
as mere morphology, but the fonnative (speciating) process that humans ought to preserve" (p. 137, Rolston's emphasis).

P

eople should use animals
only in ways that do not
impair the natural evolutionary
process of speciation. People
should avoid causing animals to
suffer or die, except when doing so
is part of the natural, evolutionary
process of speciation. People
should alleviate animal suffering
and prevent animals deaths only
when doing so leaves evolutionary
processes unimpaired.

I consider this idea to be the key to understanding human duties concerning the suffering and use of animals. 8 People should use
animals only in ways that do not appreciably
impair the natural evolutionary process of speciation. People should avoid causing animals
to suffer or die, except when doing so is part
of the natural, evolutionary process of speciation. People should alleviate animal suffering
and prevent animals deaths only when doing
so leaves evolutionary processes unimpaired.
Between the Species
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human life. Thus, where no alternatives are
feasible, it is legitimate to kill animal pests
who threaten human health or vital human
food supplies. Similarly in those relatively
rare cases when animal experimentation is
required to meet pressing human health
needs, medical experimentation on animals is
justified. This is not to say, however, that
most current practices concerning animal
pests and medical experimentation on
animals are justified. It is merely to say that,
granting greater value to people than to any
other of the environment's constituents, one
can imagine situations in which some use of
animal extermination and experimentation
would be justified.
Where vital human needs are not at issue,
significant impositions on animals are unjustified, except when needed to reestablish ecological balances that people have upset.
Rolston is correct, I believe, when he objects
to a rancher's (largely unnecessary) stretch of
fencing that blocked antelope from migrating
as usual, and as needed, to winter foraging
areas (pp. 54-55). But in light of the premises
he accepts. Rolston should add considerably
to the list of impermissible activities in technologically sophisticated cultures.
People in modem cultures have no real
need for products made with fur or leather.
Killing animals to provide materials for such
products is totally unjustified, even if the
animals are raised humanely for this purpose,
because killing an animal (obviously) harms it
greatly, and thus requires a strong justification. Where there is no real need for products
made with leather or fur, there is insufficient
justification. A fortiori, painful trapping
methods are unjustified.
Hunting and fishing are also unjustified,
except when they serve the needs of human
subsistence. Since meat is nutritionally super-

integral to such areas, they should no more be
disturbed, or disturb themselves, in response
to animal suffering and death than should
other environmental constituents be disturbed to ameliorate such suffering or reduce
the rate of animal mortality.
On the other hand, the vast majority of
human beings live in cultures whose presence
tends to reduce biotic diversity. These are
agricultural, industrial and post-industrial cultures. People in these cultures cannot claim
that the animal suffering and death they cause
is necessary for the preservation of wilderness
areas and natural speciation. Since an overriding need or good is required to justify
causing any being to suffer or die, some other
significant consideration(s) will have to be
adduced to justify practices in modem cultures that cause animal suffering and death.
For example, innocent people have a right
to self-defense and to protection by others
when self-defense is not possible. This is based
on the idea, elaborated by Rolston (pp. 6275), that the human capacities for morality
and other cultural pursuits make individual
human beings more valuable than individuals
of other species. So when push comes to
shove, as in cases of self-defense and the
defense of individual human beings from
animal attacks, animals should be sacrificed
for human welfare. But a technologically
sophisticated culture can and should arrange
matters so as to minimize attacks by animals,
for example, by not breeding and training
dogs for fighting and guard duty.
Other examples of permissible animal sacrifice in technologically sophisticated culture
are also based on the idea that if human
beings are more valuable than any other
beings, then it is reasonable that human
beings cause animals to suffer and die when
this is truly necessary for the preservation of
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£luous in the human diet, anyone who has
alternatives available should avoid killing
animals for food.
By the same token, people who have available alternatives, e.g., virtually everyone in
the United States, should avoid eating the
meat of animals killed by others and should
avoid raising animals to be killed for their
meat. Even when the animals are raised
humanely, killing them is unjustified. A ferrtiori, factory farming, which causes great
animal suffering, is unjustified.
Many species of animals suffer greatly under
the conditions of confinement characteristic
of most zoos. Human curiosity about these
animals is not a need of such magnitude as to
justify causing this suffering, especially since
books, wildlife photography, and films can
meet whatever need exists.
Animal entertainments are fine so long as
the animals involved are among those being
entertained. It is hard to imagine much joy for
the animals in a cockfight or bullfight. I
remain skeptical of trainers' and owners'
claims that their dogs and horses really enjoy
or crave racing as hard as they do. But I have
seen dogs fetch sticks with apparent enjoyment. The event did not draw a paying crowd,
however.
In sum, people should not cause animals to
suffer or die unnecessarily, because suffering
and death are harmful. In light of the value of
natural speciation in the biosphere, however,
people should not intervene in the wild to
ameliorate animal suffering. For the same
reason, people living in technologically simple
cultures (which do not impair natural speciation) have no duty to renounce practices
essential to their cultures which cause animals
to suffer and die. Because normal human
beings are of greater value than are individual
animals, innocent people have a right to self-
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defense and to defense by others in case of
animal attack. They are also justified in some
extermination of animal pests and in some use
of animals in medical experiments. But
because people in technologically sophisticated cultures have no need for fur, meat, and
leather, all rearing and killing of animals to
secure these products is impermissible. Similarly, since people have no need for recreations
that harm animals, such as hunting, fishing
and horse racing, these recreations are also
impermissible. Abiding by these limitations,
we fulfill our role as the biosphere's morally
responsible members. While our natural superiority gives us the privilege of self-defense,
defense of innocent human beings, and rights
to limited extermination and experimentation, it denies to us products and pursuits that
involve unnecessary suffering and death. This,
I believe, is treating animals naturally.
Notes
1 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1988). All references to this work will be made by
page number in the text.
2 For convenience I use "animals" throughout
for "nonhuman animals."
3 Robert W. Loftin, "The Morality of Hunting,"
Environmental Ethics Vol. 6, No.3 (Fall 1984) pp.
244-245.
4 See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New
York: Avon Books, 1975) p. 48.
5 Singer, pp.121-128.
6 See my book Environmental]ustice (Albany,
N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1988), especially Chapters 7
and 13.
7 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1949, 1969) p. 216.
8 It is key to guidance concerning the use of
other environmental constituents as well, but that
is beyond the scope of the present paper. See E1Wironmental]ustice, pp. 300-309.
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